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FOOD AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS; THE ROLE OF 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL 
, COMMERCE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Until that now famous series of Russian grain sales 
took place in 1972 agricultural policy in the United States 
had begun to lose its sex appeal! It had its challenges in 
the drought and depression years of the '30s, and again 
during World War II, but in both those cases the concern 
was whether we could produce enough for our needs. In the 
earlier of those decades, we had an additional preoccupation 
with the economic survival of our farming communities. Farm 
families had to.be strong in every sense of the word to live 
through the '30s. 
In the '50s and early '60s, we experienced a nelv problem 
one of recurrent surpluses. Those "ever normal granaries" 
of the FOR era became ever normally full and overflowing two 
decades later. Farm incomes plummeted, not because farmers 
pr~duced too little, but because they produced too much! The 
situation did have its bright spots though, at least to some 
people; "cheap food" became a way of life in the U.S. Our 
consumers experienced the pleasure of having more and more 
money left in their pocketbooks after doing their weekly 
grocery shopping. This occurred not simply because their 
husbands (and the working wives too!) brought home a bigger 
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pay check, but also because a smaller percentage of that pay 
check went for food. By the early '70s, the percentage had 
dropped below 16, even though people were eating out more 
than ever before. American families contentedly went about 
spending more money for other things. 
Consumers in importing countries benefitted from the 
surpluses' (most of which were held in the U. S. and Canada) 
too. We and other exporters discovered that it cost money 
to store surpluses, and that one could afford to move them 
on the world market even if it meant shaving prices in some 
manner. This led, for example, to "food aid" programs in 
which a nation would either give away its surpluses, or sell 
them through the use of long term credit ,vi th exceptionally 
low interest rates. With food aid programs (P.L. 480 for the 
U.S.), exporters could reduce their surpluses and feel like 
humanitarians at the same time! 
The exporting nations soon learned, however, that their 
surpluses were too large to be fully absorbed by food aid, 
i.e., we couldn't even give all that grain away in the 
developing world. This then led to use of the export subsidy, 
still one of the most invidious of all trade practices. One 
can compete on any market if one's Federal treasury is lar<]e 
enough! These subsidies proved to be costly indeed (though 
perhaps less costly than storage), but they moved a lot of 
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food to importing nations at bargain basement prices. U.S • 
consumers were happy because food costs remained low, and 
taxpayer costs, though high, were tolerated because we seemed 
to be making progress in reducing the surpluses. Exports 
increased dramatically; not just because of subsidies, but 
because of a growth in "lOrldwide demand for food products 
and an ever widening competitive advantage for the American 
farmer. 
Then in 1972 the Soviet Union triggered a never to be 
forgotten series of events by entering the world food market 
in a massive ,yay. Food prices in the U. S. skyrocketed, or 
at least consumers thought they did! Though the percentage 
of income expended for food never did rise beyond a mean of 
18, even that 2 percent jump seemed devastating to house.-
wives accustomed to paying the same amount at the checkout 
. counter every week of the year! . Con'sumer advocate groups 
looked for villains in the picture, and almost everyone in 
the production and marketing process was castigated before 
the issue quieted down. 
U.S. agricultural exports skyrocketed too, and this led 
to a strengthening of the dollar and a vast improvement in 
both our balance and terms of trade (helped, admittedly, by 
the dollar devaluations of this .,period). Consumers benefitted 
significantly from this, but few recognized those benefits. 
They, in fact, argued vehemently for the imposition of export 
· ... ": . 
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controls, and the government complied, though only on a few 
occasions and for very short periods of time. The use of 
export controls shattered our image as a dependable supplier 
of food, and we will pay dearly for that in years to come. 
American farmers entered a period of unprecedented 
prosperity. Farm incomes leaped, and the implement dealers, 
auto salesmen, and travel agents of small town America had 
the finest derivative income years of their lives too. Rural 
America, which had been in the economic doldrums, was re-
vitalized as never before. Farmers, however, quickly capi-
talized their increased incomes into land, and farm real 
estate prices soared. Though this made net worth statements 
a lot more impp"ssive than previously, it also reduced our 
agricultural co:': .·..,titive advantage on the world scene -- a 
troublesome orne:.'. r the future. 
·In 1973 and ) 
hunger, and the T' 
and thousands of 
Malthusians had 
:, everyone became .. an expert on world 
~ devoted hundreds of radio and TV hours 
.int lines to this topic. The 20th Century 
field day. They hawked their doomsday 
philosophy on aJ.,,)st a full time basis. Amidst all the 
rhetoric, the mc:.:.c relevant response came from farmers around 
the world! They ~'..,acted to the excellent prices by expanding 
production, a bas: ·.'!conomic principle which had nearly been 
forgotten in the .~husian shuffle! As a result, we are 
.' ,--'~"-', . 
· j 
: 
- 5 -
now back to more comfortable carryover levels, a propitious 
time for objectively examining agricultural trade policy in 
the U. S', and elsewhere, 
Let us turn first to the developing countries, to whom 
this issue is often a matter of life or death. 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Production Disincentives 
Trade policy has both its production and marketing aspects. 
In de'leloping countries, the former is often more important 
than the latter. Unfortunately, in attempting to follow the 
cheap food policies of the developed world, too many developing 
countries have actually discouraged agricultural production. 
This may be politically wise in the short run, but in the long 
run it is a devastating mistake. This became painfully evident 
to food importing LDCs in the post-1972 period, when their 
terms of trade deteriorated dramatically. 
Of even greater signi~icance is that industrial produc-
tivity in any nation simply cannot advance, and levels of 
living cannot improve, until manpower can be released from 
its agricultural sector. This calls for enormous increases 
in agricultural efficiency, an unlikely result when govern-
ment is providing production disincentives! 
Import Restrictions 
Some developing countries have gone to the other extreme 
in production policy by opting to protect their domestic agri-
cultural producers through the use of import restrictions (often 
• 
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as an accompaniment to high support levels). In many in-
stances the economic objective is a laudable one, in that 
it provides a production stimulus. Unfortunately, it is 
not a policy that is likely to lead to efficient production. 
Increased self sufficiency is an understandable goal, parti-
cularly for countries that·are experiencing balance of pay-
ments problems. (Brazil is the classic example today, but 
the same argument can be made for all LDCs who are suffering 
through the present energy crisis.) 'One must be concerned, 
however, lest import restrictions taken for legitimate 
reasons -- be retained when those reasons no longer apply. 
This has often occurred, to the chagrin of the offending 
nation's trading partners, and to the economic disadvantage 
of the world as a whole. Such violations of the spirit, if 
no·t ,the rules, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(the GATT) call for a more careful and continual appraisal 
of such practices under the GATT, and for timely termination 
thereof. 
The import regimes of some developing countries have 
been so protective that their domestic industries have be-
come complacent, lethargic, and inefficient. This has re-
duced (or eliminated) their international competitiveness, 
thereby worsening the natic's terms of trade -- the exact 
opposite of what was inten To their great credit, the 
governments of a number of 
.2s (Argentina and Colombia, 
e.g.) have recently recognized this incongruity, and have 
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had the political courage to do something about it by opening 
their borders to increased competition. Such action inevitably 
incurs the enmity of the protected domestic industries, but 
the government may actually have done them a great favor. An 
economically trouBled firm or industry cannot survive inde-
finitely on the domestic scene, let alone in fierce inter-
national competition. If the firm or industry is forced to 
meet import competition head on~ (the assumption being that 
the import competition is fair), it may modernize, alter its 
management structure, and take other steps that will be in 
its own long term interest. 
Export Subsidies 
A frequent rationale for LDC protectionism, and for the 
use of export subsidies, is that of developing infant industries. 
The idea, of course, is that in the absence of such assistance, 
LDC industries will never be able· to' achieve the economies 
of scale essential to compete with their developed country 
brethern. I am prepared to accept that argument -- up to a 
point! Developing countries deserve a chance to improve their 
competitiveness, but there comes a time when an "infant industry" 
is no longer an infant! If the governmental protections 
and incentives are successful, the industry "grows up" and 
at that point it no longer merits special priv:L1eges in 
international trade • 
Some LDCs have suggested. in the Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations in Geneva, that GATT rules should permit them to 
subsidize exports with impunity. That is simply an 
- 8 -
economically (and politically) unacceptable proposal. It has 
also been suggested that "safeguard" actions by developed 
countries should exempt all imports from LDCs. That too is 
an unacceptable suggestion, for the same reasons. Assisting 
the LDCs, their industries and firms to be competitive is 
one thing; to ask their DC competitors to battle them on a 
permanently disadvantageous basis is quite another thing! 
Preferences 
Agricultural produc·l:s are a major export item, often the 
major export item, for many developing countries. Others have 
the resource base to become exporters if and when they get 
their economies on track. Thus, it is understandable that 
the LDCs delineate enhanced access to DC markets as one of 
their principal objectives in the economic sphere. Though 
that objective extends to both agricultural and industrial 
goods,the former offer the greatest.i~mediate potential for 
many LDCs. 
The United States and most other developed countries 
have granted temporary tariff preferences to many developing 
countries on hundreds of items. The U.S. system, for example, 
encompasses about 2,800 items involving nearly $3 billi.on of 
LDC imports. (Most, however, are industrial items.) More 
importantly, we import nearly $25 billion worth of these 
same goods from our fellow developed countries. Duty free 
. , 
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treatment for LDCs should afford them an opportunity to capture 
a sizeable segment of that market • 
"Speciial and Differential" Treatment 
One disadvantage of preference systems, from the develop-
ing country viewpoint, is that they are temporary. The U.S. 
system has a 10 year life, but it includes provisions for 
the earlier removal of countries and products from its bene-
fits under certain circumstances. In other words, the system 
is by no means comparable to permanent benefits that can be 
provided LDCs in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. For 
this reason, many LDCs see the MTN as the forum with the most 
potential for enhancing their market opportunities in the 
developed world. 
In the Tokyo Declaration of 1973, which launched the 
current, seventh post-war MTN, the DCs agreed to provide 
"special and differential treatment" for their LDC counter-
parts as the negotiations unfolded. A great deal of effort 
has been expended since then in attempting to delimit areas 
where special and differential treatment -- which by defini-
tion constitutes a departure from the most-favored-nation 
principle -- would be appropriate and desirable. The United 
States has expressed a willingness to consider such treatment 
in most of the MTN negotiating groups, and we have outlined 
our ideas on the subject in a number of papers that have been 
! , 
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submitted in Geneva. I am optimistic that LDCs will gain 
significant market opportunities for their agricultural 
products before the MTN concludes. 
Commodity Agreements 
Nearly all developing countries have a constant concern 
with their balance of payments situation. With limited foreign 
exchange reserves, they are extremely vulnerable to price 
fluctuations in both export and import goods. Raw materials 
prices have traditionally fluctuated,. sometimes violently, 
on world markets. In agriculture, this is often due to 
supply being a function of unpredictable weather conditions. 
With virtually all LDCs being either food importers or ex-
porters, they continually suffer through the foreign exchange 
impact of erratic commodity prices. What is the answer? 
There are many, but the one typically given by developing 
countries is an international corrmodity agreement with 
buffer stocks. 
One cannot summarily reject the commodity agreement 
answer for it has a lot of political appeal, at least at 
present. Nor should one reject it on economic grounds, 
for a commodity agreement may be able to inject a certain 
degree of stability in the world market of a given product. 
With a strong commitment by exporters to honor price ceil-
ings, an equally strong commitment by importers to honor 
price floors, price bands that are ,,,ide enough to permit 
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the market to work most of the time, provisions for new 
suppliers to enter the market, a large enough buffer stock 
to be influential when the margins are reached, and no readily 
available substitutes, a commodity agreement has a fair chance 
for success. Rarely, however, are all exporter and importer 
nations willing to accept the cost, the discipline, and the 
commitment that are essential to make such an agreement work. 
Therefore, without even considering the philosophical aspects 
of international commodity agreements, one must conclude that 
the practical realities of economic life are such as to doom 
most such agreements to failure. In fact, a careful cost-
benefit analysis will preclude most of them from even being 
initiated! 
Many LDCs, however, view commodity agreements as a 
mechanism for raising the price of raw materials they export. 
In other words, they see some budding OPECs in the offing. 
But this is unrealistic; it is most unlikely that any commo-
dicy agreement that would achieve this purpose can be 
successfully negotiated. For this to occur, one would have 
to assume: (1) that importer participants in such an agree-
ment will be inept negotiators, or (2) that developed country 
importers will deliberately accede to the use of commodit,' 
agreements as a new foreign aid mechanism. Neither would 
seem to be a reasonable assumption. Furthermore, if a 
commodity agreement were "successful" in raising prices, 
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that success would likely be short lived. Since developing 
countries are the primary importers of many commodities, 
they would be the ones to suffer most from the price rise. 
It would be rational to assume they would object (though one 
must wonder about this assumption in light of the compliant 
acceptance of OPEC). Beyond that, however, commodity price 
increases will unquestionably stimulate the development and 
use of substitutes. This alone will make most, if not all, 
price enhancing commodity agreements viable for only a short 
period of time. 
The objective sh~red by developed and developing 
countries alike -- of affording LDCs a greater opportunity 
to expand exports,and hopefully a more attractive net in-
come·for those exports, is a valid one. It is also highly 
desirable in humanitarian terms, and for maintenance of 
peace in the world. But surely there are better ways to do 
. this than through the use of international commodity agreements. 
-(at least as they have traditionally been designed) ! 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Production Incentives 
As I indicated earlier, one of the paradoxes of agri-
. ; 
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the cost is enormous and the resultant surpluses can be sold 
internationally only through the use of export subsidies (to 
say nothing of the import restrictions that are necessary to 
keep the system functioning). In other words, many developed 
countries deliberately maintain an agricultural production 
plant that is uncompetitive internationally! They do this, 
allegedly at least; for social reaSons. The argument made 
is that their respective countries are better off by keeping 
a substantial segment of the populatton in rural areas, rather 
than to have them migrate to the cities. (Though some migra-
tion is occurring nonetheless, the rate is quite low.) 
It is not my intent to challenge the social policy of 
these developed nations. Nor is it my prerogative to do SO) 
they have a sovereign right to choose whatever social policy 
they wish. I have traveled many of thos~ countries, and I 
too'appreciate the beauty of their countrysitles and the 
quaintness of their small farms 
BU± as an economist I do object 
inefficient as they may be! 
and I believe other nations 
have a right to object -- to the distortions that those social 
policies cause in the arena of international trade! 
Unfortunately, from an economist's viewpoint, many 
developed nations have chosen to implement their rural social 
policies through the use of high support levels on agri-
cultural products. This is probably the most trade dis-
tortive (and perhaps the least cost effective) policy that 
they could possibly have chosen. Both the European Community 
"j 
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and Japan have found, for example, that to provide reasonable 
incomes for their small agricultural producers, support levels 
must be set far above world market prices. 
Export Subsidies 
The upshot of- this" is that most everyone is unhappy! 
Surpluses generated by high support levels must be sold on the 
world market through the use of export subsidies. This is not 
likely to score points with more efficient farmers in the U.S., 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and other exporting 
nations \vho find their own exports undercut by the subsidies. 
Trade policy experts call this the "third country" subsidy 
problem. It is an issue for which the present GATT rules are 
totally inadequate. (Because of this, the U.S. no", has 
authority to deal with such unfair trade practices under 
domestic law /Sec. 301 of the Trade Act of 19747, and about 
a dozen complaints have already been'filed.) 
Export subsidies can, of course, also be used to pene-
tr~te markets that would ordinarily be served by domestic 
producers. The European Community, for example, has long 
subsidized its cheese exports to the U.S. This not only 
undercuts exports by Australia and New Zealand (the third 
country subsidy problem), but it also takes part of the 
U.S. market away from American dairy farmers. The proper 
response to such subsidies is the application of counter-
- 15 -
vailing duties (i.e., a duty equal to the subsidy, which 
effectively neutralizes it), but subsidizing exporters 
contend that countervailing is inappropriate unless "injury" 
is shown. (I would counter this contention by asserting that 
injury is inherent in the use of direct export subsidies. 
After all, the purpose of such a subsidy is to penetrate a 
market that would not otherwise be penetrable.) 
If export subsidies undercut world market prices, im-
porters benefit from this unanticipated developed count.ry 
generosity. So long as they are not attempting to develop 
their own production of the product in question, the price 
cutting is a foreign exchange bonanza for them. Nevertheless, 
they are concerned about the long run implications of subsidy 
practices. 
If developed countries use export subsidies to rid them-
selves of agricultural surpluses, they can use such subsidies 
to rid themselves of other surpluses too. Some of these will 
inevitably undercut exports from the developing world. Com-
peting with the treasuries of the deve~oped countries is not 
an enticing thought for LDCs with balance of payments problems. 
But perhaps their major concern is that developed countries 
typically use subsidies on products in which they are no 
longer competitive. These are labor intensive products, both 
agricultural and industrial, where developLc" countries now 
1------ ----- -'"-----------: ... ------"--.-... --~-------.. -----.. - -.-...... - ... ~ ............ __ ....•.... _-.- .. -.-.~ .••. -.. --.-.- .. -.-.... . 
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have either an absolute or comparative advantage. The con-
tention of the LDCs, and a legitimate one, is that developed 
countries should be phasing out these industries, or at a 
minimum should be phasing out their uncompetitive firms. By 
no means should they be expanding production of such goods 
through the use of subsidies at a time when the LDCs are 
trying to find a meaningful niche in the international trading 
world. 
Within subsidizing developed countries, economic joy is 
hardly universal either. Producers are obviously pleased 
by the support from their governments, particularly when it 
is. partially hidden in higher domestic food costs and thus 
is not readily identifiable as a government subsidy! But 
taxpayers are not at all pleased by the costs they can see 
(storage and export subsidies, e.g.), and they are uneasy 
about those they cannot see (the indirect impact of higher 
support levels on food costs). U.S. taxpayers, for example, 
objected vigorously to the million dollars per day we spent 
to-store our grain surpluses a few years ago, and also to 
the export subsidies we used prior to and including the in i-
tial Soviet grain sales. The consumers of Western Europe, with 
food prices far higher than ours, mu~t wonder about the 
wisdom of subsidizing beef sales to the Soviet Unic ·~en 
beef is not exactly a bargain in the supermarkets ot jrussels, 
Bonn, or Paris! 
There must be a better way to avoid and/or deal with 
agricultural surpluses. 
Quantitative Restrictions 
. I , 
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to the rational conduct of international trade. Whereas 
subsidies are the principal distortion on the export side, 
QRs fill a similar distortive role on the import side. No 
matter how competitive one may be, it is mighty difficult 
to penetrate a market walled in by a quantitative restriction! 
The variable levy, which increases as the world market price 
of a product falls, is no less onerous than the traditional 
QR. voluntary restraint agreements, none of which are 
truly "voluntary," are an improvement 'in degree, but not in 
kind. For purposes of this discussion all can be considered 
as quan'titative restrictions. 
As described earlier, developing countries have been 
able to rationalize at least some of their QRs under the 
GATT rules, usually on balance of payments grounds. Developed 
countries, on the other hand (including the United States), 
have struggled futilely to justify their quantitative re-
strictions, most of which are agricultural. Some which might 
have been appropriate when initiated (under safeguard rules, 
e.g.) are no longer defensible and should have been eliminated 
years ago. Others are palpably illegal, and are being re-
tained in circumvention of the GATT. If a solution to this 
problem ca,n be found, world agricultural trade will be 
immensely improved. This is one of the priority objectives 
of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. 
, 
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Standards 
Standards should be trade neutral, and both buyer and 
seller should benefit from their use. But that is not always 
the case. Japan, for example, some months ago rejected a 
shipment of U.S. citrus because the fruit had been sprayed 
with a particular chemical. Yet that chemical had been ap-
proved for use by Codex Alimentarius, an international stan-
dards making body! Of which Japan is a member! This exemp-
lifies why we need to negotiate a procedural standards code 
in the MTN. 
Administrative Guidance 
There are times "Then non-tariff barriers are extremely 
difficult to discover and characterize. A number of such 
barriers, applicable to both agricultural and non-agricultural 
goods, can loosely be described under the heading "Administra-
tive Guidance." Customs procedures' frequently fall into t'his 
category. Clearances are often inordinately delayed, and if 
the imported product is perishable, it may never reach the 
'ultimate consumer. 
Or the word is quietly passed from a government official 
to the private sector that import levels of a given product 
are becoming worrisome. The following month orders from 
those private firms begin to decline. This can be just as 
effective as a quota, though it may never appear in the form 
of a law or regulation! 
Other Distortions 
I have concentrated my attention in this paper only on 
' .. , 
" 
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those practices which I consider to be the most distortive 
• 
to world agricultural trade. Many others could be mentioned, 
particularly in the non-tariff barrier area, for nations have 
become innovative in protecting their domestic industries 
from competition. 
I have not even mentioned tariffs. Though they can be 
disruptive too, and though we need to further reduce tariffs 
in the MTN, competitive firms and industries can overcome 
many of the tariff levels that exist in the world today. Non-
tariff measures, on the other hand, can often stop a competi-
tive firm or industry in its tracks! 
Yes, it is an imperfect world! And the imperfections in 
agricultural trade are some of the most imaginative of all. 
But let us not be pessimists., Notwithstanding those imper-
fections, our own agricultural exports have nearly quadrupled 
in the past decade. N"ot a bad record, even though a fe;, 
rocks have been thrown in our p'ath. Beyond that, there are 
consumers around the ~lOrld who are picking up those rocks as 
fast as producers are throwing them. These consumers want 
a better diet, and if that calls for importing agricultural 
products, they want to import! 
Where does that leave us, in early 1977 as we move into 
the " '11 3es of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations, 
• 
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and as we debate renewal of our own farm legislation? I 
offer the following views for your consideration. 
First, we must maintain our international competitiveness, 
so that we can deal from equity and from strength at the 
negotiating table. This calls for concerted action in many 
areas: agricultural research and extension programs; the 
development of nel" agricultural technology; stimuli for 
capital investment in agriculture; sound monetary and fiscal 
policies generally; and farm legislation that will not 
jeopardize the competitiveness that already exists. Govern-
ment policies can help to maintain and enhance the efficiency 
of U.S. agriculture. Unfortunately, our big bureaucracy 
sometimes harms, while trying to help. I hope we can avoid 
that outcome in the future! 
Second, if we are competitive, we ought not apologize 
for it, and we ought to use it to our advantage. This is 
not to suggest that we use food as a "weapon," the favorite 
term of the media these days. But .it is a recognition of 
leverage, and the opportunity to use it for the benefit of 
U.S. farmers and for our nation as a whole. If we are not 
careful, we can give away that leverage in a variety of ways. 
Let's not do so! 11 
II The negotiation of an international grain reserve is 
an example of this. A grain reserve is like an insurance 
policy, the cost ~f which should be borne by the policy holder. 
In this case, that means that grain importing nations should 
bear most of the cost, not the exporting nations as has been 
true in the past! It also means· that we should not unilaterallj' 
create a "domestic grain reserve." Were we to do so, we would 
sacrifice all our leverage in this arell, and the rest of the 
world would quickly lose interest in an international reserve. 
.... - '-",'~-' 
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Third, we should proudly defend our basic agricultural 
policies. With an agricultural production and marketing 
plant that is the envy of the world, we ought to try to con-
vince others to move in our policy direction, rather than 
vice versa. Of course, conditions are different, and we 
cannot expect the rest of the world to do everything our way. 
In many cases, it would be inappropriate to do so. But neither 
is it appropriate to categorically reject our market oriented, 
free enterprise system. Many elements of our system can serve 
other nations well, perhaps more effectively than what they 
now have. Futures markets, for el{ample, have scarcely been 
used in many agricultural trading nations. 
Fourth, we should unhesitatingly challenge the trade 
distortive actions of other nations, particularly those in 
the developed world. It does not make sense to have a double 
standard for trade pol~cy (agricultu:t;al or industrial) among 
the developed nations. Though the energy crisis has had a 
greater impact on some than on others, most economies of the 
developed world are basically healthy. And to the extent 
they have economic woes, trade distortions are not the proper 
means for responding to those woes. We have authority to 
deal with unfair trade practices (1) under the GATT, and (2) 
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. He should exer-
cise that authority when the occasion demands. This is not 
economic saber rattling! It is simply the insistence that 
international trade be carri! out in a fair, sensible, and 
rational way. 
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For many years we failed to respond in such situations. 
This led other nations to believe that they could use sub-
sidies, dumping actions, import restrictions, etc. without 
experiencing anything more than a protest from Uncle Sam. 
And when the U.S. did respond (as we have recently) to such 
indefensible practices, we were painted as the villain, as 
"protectionist." It is time that that perception be corrected 
once and for all! 
Fifth, we should encourage all trading nations to be 
open, candid, and hopefully reasonable and rational in the 
de'velopment of their trade policies. This suggests that 
nations follow some basic public policy principles:' (1) 
notifying the GATT of trac:ie actions contemplated or taken, 
a courtesy that is often not extended; (2) consulting ~lith 
nations that might be affected before" rather than after, 
actions are taken; (3) using open, public procedures in the 
decisionmaking process so that anyone with interest -- nations, 
fiEms, individuals -- may have an input; and (4) keeping any 
restrictions temporary and no more onerous than absolutely 
necessary. If these principles were routinely followed, in-
ternational trade in agricultural products would be a whole 
lot more rational than it is today. 
Sixth, if our agricultural policies are right, we should 
strongly enunciate them at the negotiating table. Other 
nations often expect the U.S. to compromise, or to "give up 
- 23 -
something." It is up to us to make a negotiating round or a 
conference a "success." We are often chided for being too 
"theological" on trade issues, meaning we are unwilling to 
accept the other nation's position! But if the principle is 
sound, let's not abandon it. It just may be that once in a 
while the rest of the world is out of step, and we are in 
step! If we are confident that such is the case, we ought 
to have the political courage to say so and stick with it! 
Seventh, we must make progress un reducing agricultural 
trade barriers in the multilateral trade negotiations. With 
, 
tariffs, subsidies, import quotas, export quotas, variable 
levies, voluntary restraint agreements, and other restrictions 
still proliferating, this is hardly the time to agree to 
disagree and corne horne. Previous rounds of negotiations, 
including the Kennedy Round a decade ago, have made consider-
able progress on the industrial side"little in agriculture. 
This time we should stay in Geneva until we hammer out a 
set of agreements that will advance the cause of world trade 
in both sectors. This will not only benefit U.S. farmers, 
but consumers around the world as well. In addition, it 
provides an ideal opportunity for many nations to change 
agricultural policies that they know are outmoded. 
Perhaps the two major agricultural issues that must be 
dealt with in the Tokyo Round are (1) export subsidies, and 
, (2) quantitative restrictions, i.e., variable levies and 
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quotas. Unless progress can be made in these two key areas, 
particularly among the developed nations, the Tokyo Round will 
be construed by the U.S. agricultural community (and by agri-
cultural and other trade policy officials of many other nations 
-
as well) as being no more successful than the Kennedy Round. 
This, in turn, Ivill lead to strong demands for unilateral 
action against the trade distortive practices of others. 
Better that we all agree in Geneva (1) not to impose new 
programs in these areas, and (2) to place bound constraints 
on existing programs, ,,,ith a further agreement that they be 
phased out over an agreed adjustment period. 
Eighth, we should encourage importing nations to take 
steps to provide for their own food security, rather than to 
depend on the surpluses of exporters for that security.' Some 
of those steps are appropriate for the public sector, others 
for the private sector-, and some eouid readily involve both. 
They involve such actions as: constructing additional storage 
fo~ both raw and processed food products; buying or leasing 
storage in the U.S. and other exporting nations; the use of 
futures markets in the U.S. or elsewhere: and long term 
contractual commitments. 1/ 
1/ It is somewhat ironic that the Soviet Union, a non-
market economy nation, has done a much better job of protecting 
itself again.st the instability of price fluctuations than have 
the market economy nations of the Nestern world. The soviets 
are alreadY aggressively pursuing most elcements of the course 
that I have just outlined. 
--.-~-.------.---.. -.-----~~----- -
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Ninth, we must provide for an expansion of international 
trade with the developing nations of the world. In many 
cases, this means enhancing their agricultural exports. At 
times, those exports will penetrate the U.S. market, in com-
petition with our own producers. At other times, they will 
penetrate third country markets, in competition with our 
exporters. Nevertheless, we should accommodate this need 
in a reasonable and meaningful way. Rhetoric is not enough, 
and tokenism is not enough. When we say we prefer trade to 
aid, we have to mean it! If these nations are to become an 
integral part of the world economy we cannot reduce foreign 
aid, for the many reasons that are traditionally espoused, 
and then stymie "special and differential treatment" in the 
trade area too. That would be a hypocritical result, for 
which we would be duly and properly chastized in world public 
opinion. 
Finally, He should sell aggressively in world markets. 
Even if trade barriers are reduced or eliminated, we cannot 
expect buyers to come pounding on our door. There is much 
to be done in enhancing our reputation for producing a 
quality product, honoring our cont'ractual obligations, being 
a dependable seller, and servicing the needs of our customers. 
In addition, there are a multitude of markets to be opened, 
both geographically and for new products. Observe, for ex-
ample, the many ways in which soybean products are being used 
-~----------------,----
, 
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in the Far East. Hany of the more recent developments are 
attributable to work by our soybean industry. Observe, in 
contrast, the few tasty, corn fed T-bone steaks that are 
available, even in t.'.",e best restaurants and hotels, through-
out the world! Sirr .. ': comparisons could be made with lots 
of other products. \·;0 I ve just begun to truly market u. S. 
agricultural products. 
CONCLUSION 
There.are lots of "ifs" in the future of international 
trade in agriculture. Ifs in domestic agricultural policies, 
• ifs in the evolution of consumer movements, ifs on the poli-
tical front, ifs in bilateral and multilateral trade negotia-
tions. But the stakes are too high for us not to forge ahead. 
One can always find reasons not to move toward freer 
agricultural trade. And it is even easier to rationalize 
moves toward greater protectionism. But neither the u.S. 
nor any other major producer can afford to go that route. 
-Food is too important to the physical and economic well-
being of the world, and it will become even more so as time 
passes. Furthermore, trade restrictions are too onerous, 
and the GATT rules for agricultural commerce are simply 
inadequate. This is not the time to be hesitant and in-
decisive, let us not back away from the challenges! 
, 
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Apocryphally, a management expert once advised his client 
not to view his difficulties as "problems" or "obstacles," but 
rather as "challenges" and "opportunities;" to which the 
harassed manager responded: "Well, then I've sure got a lot 
of insurmountable opportunities!" 
I believe we can handle our agricultural trade challenges, 
-- . 
simply because the rewards for doing so are enormous -- a 
better quality of life for producers and consumers alike, 
worldwide. Surely this is not an "insurmountable opportunity." 
